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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, LOOPHOLES,
AND GIBBERISH: WHY THERE ARE STILL




This Article examines Congress’s decades-long attempt to ensure that secur-
ities class action lawsuits of national importance are litigated in federal courts.
The intent is limiting strike suits. Congress attempted to curtail strike suits
through the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”). The PSLRA required heightened pleading requirements to en-
sure the validity of federal securities class actions. Instead of solving the di-
lemma, plaintiffs circumvented the PSLRA by bringing fraud cases as state
law claims. To combat the circumvention of the PSLRA, Congress enacted the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”). SLUSA federally
preempted state law claims based on alleged misrepresentations, untrue state-
ments, or omissions of material facts, requiring them to be brought in federal
court. However, SLUSA did not address the concurrent jurisdiction provision
of the Securities Act of 1933. This created an anomaly whereby many federal
claims under the 1933 Act were brought in state courts, while state fraud
claims were required to be brought in federal court. Congress could have ad-
dressed this enigma when it enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).
Instead, CAFA, which reformed class actions generally, exempted most securi-
ties class actions from its rules. In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Cyan v.
Beaver County and allowed 1933 Act claims covered by SLUSA to continue
to be brought in state courts. The Court was silent on non-covered securities.
This Article recommends how Congress can accomplish its goal of forcing
important securities class actions into federal courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Cyan v. Beaver
County Retirement Fund, affirming that class actions could be brought
in state court if they were based on allegations of violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and they were covered securities
under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”).1
Class action lawsuits have long been a way for multiple plaintiffs with
similar damages against the same defendant to engage in collective
litigation.2 This saves time and reduces duplication of resources by al-
lowing one plaintiff to act on behalf of the class and then split the
damages among all the defendants.3 This has been an especially useful
tool in securities litigation because many shareholders often fall victim
to the same misdealing by a corporation in which they own stock. The
broad anti-fraud provisions in the 1933 Act and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) often served as the basis for these class ac-
tions as both acts create a private right of action.4 Subsequent to the
enactment of these two acts, many allegations of class action abuse
arose, claiming that the class action attorneys were creating strike
suits with little benefit to the plaintiffs but creating high fees for the
attorneys.5 Further, it was alleged that people were filing class action
lawsuits based on a drop in stock value without having any evidence
of misdoing by the company.6 To curb these abuses, Congress enacted
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in 1995.7
The PSLRA added heightened pleading requirements and changed
class certification standards. The PSLRA, however, had the unin-
tended consequence of pushing cases to state courts so litigants could
avoid these changes. Litigants would file class actions in state courts
alleging either state law violations or violations of the 1933 Act, which
1. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018).
2. Susan T. Spence, Looking Back . . . In a Collective Way: A Short History of
Class Action Law, 11 A.B.A. SEC. BUS. L. REP. 6 (2002).
3. Id.
4. Doug Greene, Jessie Gabriel, Marco Molina & Brian Song, The Coming Se-
curities Class Action Storm: Multijurisdictional Litigation After Cyan, 32 PLUS J. 1
(2018), https://www.wileyrein.com/media/publication/486_Q32018.pdf [https://perma
.cc/NF3B-FE79].
5. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
6. Id.
7. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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allows for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction. Plaintiffs often en-
gaged in forum shopping to file their cases in what they considered
plaintiff-friendly states.8 Thus, the PSLRA was generally ineffective at
curbing class action abuse.9
Congress responded in 1998 by passing SLUSA10 to quell state
court securities class actions. SLUSA sought to enact national stan-
dards for securities litigation. It did this by creating federal preemp-
tion over cases that alleged misrepresentation, untrue statements, or
omissions of material facts. Federal courts required the heightened
standards set forth in the PSLRA. However, while SLUSA was clear
that federal preemption existed over state law claims, it did not ad-
dress the concurrent jurisdiction provision in the 1933 Act.11 There-
fore, it was unclear if SLUSA amended the 1933 Act—thus forcing
1933 Act claims to be litigated in federal court.12 This lead to inconsis-
tent results at the district court level. In some circuits, federal district
courts required that state law claims be brought in federal court, but
allowed federal law claims under the 1933 Act to be brought in state
court.13 District courts in other circuits required 1933 Act claims cov-
ered by SLUSA to be litigated in federal court.14 This split eventually
led to the Cyan decision, which attempted to determine the proper
interpretation of SLUSA’s jurisdictional requirements, which Justice
Alito called “gibberish.”15
In 2005, Congress again reformed class action litigation by enacting
the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).16 CAFA was designed to
require all class actions of national interest to be litigated in federal
courts. Because Congress had addressed securities reform in the
PSLRA and SLUSA, CAFA exempted cases involving covered securi-
ties.17 This created another loophole leading to forum shopping. The
Ninth Circuit, when examining the interplay between CAFA and
SLUSA, allowed cases involving 1933 Act claims on non-covered se-
8. Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 311 (1998).
9. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 1 (1995).
10. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11. Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Shiwon Choe, State Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear
Securities Act Class Actions, But the Frequent Failure to Ask the Right Question Too
Often Produces the Wrong Answer, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 744–45 (2015).
12. Id. at 745.
13. Matthew O’Brien, Choice of Forum in Securities Class Actions: Confronting
“Reform” of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 862 (2009).
14. Id.
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Cyan v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138
S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (No. 15-1439) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
16. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
17. Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 622 (2006).
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curities to be litigated in state court.18 The Seventh Circuit took the
opposite approach and required all 1933 Act claims meeting CAFA’s
jurisdictional requirements to be litigated in federal court.19 This split
allowed another avenue to use forum shopping to bring a securities
class action in state court.
This Article traces the long history of securities class action litiga-
tion. It examines how plaintiffs have tried to find ways to litigate these
cases in state courts, and how Congress has tried to federally preempt
securities class actions. It has been judicially determined that some
1933 Act claims may be litigated in state courts—leaving opportuni-
ties for forum shopping.20 This Article examines whether this conse-
quence conflicts with Congress’s intent and makes recommendations
to prevent future litigation in state courts. Part II discusses the history
of securities class actions, including the first recognition of private
rights of action for securities lawsuits, as well as the jurisdictional
anomalies present in the early securities class action statutes. Part III
provides a background of class action litigation generally, from its
early roots in England to its recognition as a viable and efficient
means of litigation in the United States. Part IV examines the rise of
securities class action litigation, while Part V analyzes Congress’s vari-
ous attempts to curb the increasing abuse. Part VI examines the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Cyan and its likely impact and
unintended consequences.
II. THE HISTORY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
A. Private Rights of Action
Shortly after the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted two
major pieces of legislation to protect investors by promoting honesty
and fairness in the United States securities markets. The first of these
acts was the 1933 Act.21 The 1933 Act requires that those who initially
introduce securities into the market give “full and fair disclosure of
information to the public in the sales of [those] securities.”22 The fol-
lowing year, Congress passed the 1934 Act.23 In contrast to the 1933
Act, the 1934 Act is “chiefly concerned with the regulation of post-
distribution trading on the [n]ation’s stock exchanges and securities
trading markets.”24 The purpose is to prevent fraud in securities trans-
18. See Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.
2008).
19. See Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009).
20. See, e.g., Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1072–73
(2018).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012).
22. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012).
24. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).
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actions after the initial issuance of securities.25 Both the 1933 Act and
the 1934 Act have broad antifraud provisions. Section 11 of the 1933
Act creates a private right of action allowing for a person acquiring a
security to sue if the registration statement contains an untrue state-
ment of material fact or an omission of a material fact.26 The same
section authorizes the person who acquired the security to sue every
person who signed the registration statement, every person who was a
director or partner of the security issuer at the time the registration
statement was filed, every person named in the registration statement
as about to become a director, every accountant, engineer, or ap-
praiser, and every underwriter with respect to the security.27
Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act has a similar provision creating
liability for anyone who “by means of a prospectus or oral communi-
cation, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.”28
Similarly, the 1934 Act also contains a broad antifraud provision in
section 10(b). It states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.29
Thus, the 1934 Act gave the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) the power to promulgate rules to prevent fraudulent acts re-
garding sales of securities.30 The SEC responded to this power by
promulgating Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 provides a broad range of what
is considered to be fraudulent under the 1933 Act. Rule 10 b-5 makes
it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
25. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
27. Id.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2012).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.31
To help further the purpose of the 1933 Act, Congress allowed “any
person” who acquired a security to bring a case under the antifraud
provision.32 In doing so, Congress explicitly created a private cause of
action for a person who acquired a security that was issued in viola-
tion of the Act. In contrast, no such right is explicitly stated in the
1934 Act. However, the courts construing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 concluded that Congress intended to create a private remedy for
violations of those acts as well.33 A federal court first recognized a
private right of action under Rule 10b-5 in 1946, which was just four
years after the adoption of the rule.34 In that case, Kardon v. National
Gypsum Company, the court allowed a private plaintiff to bring an
action for being induced by a conspiracy to sell stock for less than its
value.35 The court in Kardon recognized that neither section 10(b) nor
Rule 10b-5 explicitly recognized a private right of action.36 However,
it opined that without a private right of action, the plaintiffs would
have no remedy.37 While Congress may make a rule in which a plain-
tiff would have no remedy, the court noted that any intention to do so
“should appear very clearly and plainly.”38 Once Kardon recognized a
private right of action, its holding was adopted by other courts. Even-
tually, in 1971, the Supreme Court first recognized a private right of
action under the 1934 Act in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Company.39 In a footnote, the Court stated without
explanation that “[i]t is now established that a private right of action is
implied under [section] 10(b).”40 Since then, the Court has repeatedly
recognized this private right of action.41 In addition, the Court noted
private actions provide “a most effective weapon in the enforcement”
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
33. Scott M. Murray, Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver:
The Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak: There is No Implied Pri-
vate Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5,
30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 484–85 (1996).
34. Id. at 485.
35. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 514.
39. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
40. Id. at 13 n.9.
41. See, e.g., Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 382 (2014); Amgen
Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 487 (2013); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84 (2006); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
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of the securities laws and are “a necessary supplement to Commission
action.”42
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction of the 1933 Act
While both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act allow for private rights of
action, they differ in federal and state jurisdiction. Section 22(a) of the
1933 Act authorized concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state
courts of “all suits brought to enforce any liability or duty” created by
the Act.43 Additionally—and rather unusually—along with concurrent
jurisdiction, the 1933 Act also has an anti-removal provision.44 Section
22(a) states that “[n]o case arising under this title and brought in any
State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of
the United States.”45 This allows a plaintiff the choice to bring a 1933
Act case in state court without the defendant having the ability to
remove it to federal court.46 These two mechanisms in section 22(a)
are designed to be friendly to the plaintiff.47 They allow plaintiffs
bringing 1933 Act claims to ultimately choose the forum in which the
case is litigated.48
The 1934 Act does not have a jurisdictional provision like the one in
section 22(a) of the 1933 Act. While allowing for private rights of ac-
tion, the 1934 Act confers only federal jurisdiction on cases brought
under the statute.49 Section 27 of the 1934 Act states:
the district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder.50
This provision limited those suing for violating the 1934 Act (or
rules that arise under its provisions) from litigating the case in a state
court.51 Interestingly, Congress contemplated exclusive federal juris-
diction for the 1933 Act as well, but ultimately chose to allow concur-
rent jurisdiction.52 The reasons for the disparity in the jurisdictional
42. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quot-
ing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
43. 15 U.S.C § 77v(a) (2012).
44. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012).
46. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066.
47. Denise Mazzeo, Securities Class Actions, CAFA, and a Countrywide Crisis: A
Call for Clarity and Consistency, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1433, 1443–44 (2009).
48. Stephen O’Connor, The Securities Act of 1933: A Jurisdictional Puzzle, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1233, 1239 (2014).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012).
50. Id.
51. Cyan, 138 S.Ct. at 1066.
52. Mazzeo, supra note 47, at 1444 (citing 78 CONG. REC. 8563, 8571 (1934) (state- R
ment of Sen. Byrnes)).
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standards are unclear.53 There is a dearth of legislative history as to
why section 22 of the 1933 Act contains the anti-removal provision.54
This is surprising because of the rarity of anti-removal provisions in
federal law.55
The antifraud provisions of the 1933 and the 1934 Acts became the
cornerstone of securities class action litigation. With both allowing for
private rights of action, purchasers of securities could individually sue
issuers and resellers of securities and seek damages. This obviated the
need for intervention by the SEC for such lawsuits. Today, modern
securities class actions are also known for reducing redundant lawsuits
because often many people are aggrieved in the same way by the same
issuer in securities fraud cases. However, to fully understand the goal
of class actions, some background history on class action litigation in
general is helpful.
III. THE HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
The roots of class action litigation go back to early English law,
likely as far back as an 1199 case called Master Martin Rector of
Barkway v. Parishioners of Nuthampstead.56 The case involved collec-
tive litigation by a parish rector against multiple parishioners to col-
lect parochial fees.57 Four parishioners brought the case on behalf of
the rest of the petitioners in the court of the Archbishop of Canter-
bury.58 This allowed for the rector to litigate his claims over charges
for and locations of burials against the entire parish with four repre-
sentative plaintiffs.59
The earliest cited example of a judicially-created class action arose
in a 1309 case entitled Discart v. Otes.60 This case entailed a man who
lived in the Channel Islands.61 The Channel Islands were Norman by
heritage, but after the Norman Conquest they became subject to En-
glish rule.62 Subsequently, King Edward I granted ownership of the
Channel Islands to Sir Otes Grandison.63 Otes decreed that all money
due to him or to the crown be paid in French currency instead of the
local coinage of the Channel Islands. Jordan Discart was a granger for
the king and owed the crown a commission on the sale of corn.64 Dis-
53. O’Connor, supra note 48, at 1240. R
54. Mazzeo, supra note 47, at 1443. R
55. Id.
56. Spence, supra note 2. R
57. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes
in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U.
L. REV. 515, 521 (1974).
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cart made the commission payments in the local currency of the Chan-
nel Islands. However, Otes demanded that Discart pay the
commission in French currency instead.65 Discart was not the only
person who wanted to pay such fees in the local currency,66 so he filed
a bill to have the dispute resolved with the justices in General Eyre of
the Channel Islands.67 The justices of the General Eyre avoided decid-
ing the case and instead referred that matter to the King’s Council. In
doing so, the justices required that Discart and “all that are in like
case with [Discart were] bidden to appear . . . before that same Coun-
cil, either in person or by someone representing them all, to hear its
opinion and to receive such judgment as shall there be delivered.”68
Thus, the justices of the General Eyre created the first known class
action.69
The 1820 case of West v. Randall70 is recognized as the first class
action in the United States.71 It was brought in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Circuit of Rhode Island, which now is the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.72 West involved a
dispute over an accounting of property conveyed by William West to
one of his heirs.73 The heir brought an action against the survivors of
four trustees to account for property conveyed to them to pay West’s
debts.74 The heir claimed a portion of West’s estate. However, West’s
other heirs and his personal representative were not made parties to
the lawsuit.75 In response to the lawsuit, the defendants named other
heirs and alleged that they were within the jurisdiction of the court.76
Applying general rules of equity, the court noted “that all persons ma-
terially interested, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the subject mat-
ter of the bill ought to be made parties to the suit, however numerous
they may be.”77 The case, however, did not indicate that parties who
were absent would be bound by the lawsuit.





68. Id. (quoting Discart v. Otes, 30 Seld. Society 137 (No. 158, P.C. 1309) (1914)).
69. Id.
70. West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424).
71. Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of Repre-
sentation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 607, 621 n.55 (1993).
72. J. Britton Whitbeck, Identity Crisis: Class Certification, Aggregate Proof, and
How Rule 23 May Be Self-Defeating the Policy for Which It Was Established, 32 PACE
L. REV. 488, 489 (2012).
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Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot,
without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be
all brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with
making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having suf-
ficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the
plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in
such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and
claims of all the absent parties.78
Rule 48 allowed for collective litigation, but did not form true class
actions because the class did not represent parties who were absent in
the litigation. The Supreme Court examined collective litigation in
1853 in a case styled Smith v. Swormstedt.79 Smith involved a group of
traveling preachers dissociating from the Methodist Episcopal
Church.80 Differences within the church about slavery led to a division
in the church, creating two separate entities: the Methodist Episcopal
Church South and the Methodist Episcopal Church North.81 The
church, prior to the division, had a fund called the Book Concern. The
southern branch of the church argued that they were promised shares
of the Book Concern, and that the promise partially induced them to
separate.82 The northern division argued that the case did not include
all of the proper parties. The southern division alleged that 1,500
preachers were affected and that each had an interest in the Book
Concern. Because of the number of plaintiffs, some argued it was “im-
possible . . . to make them all parties to the bill.”83 The Court noted
that:
The rule is well established, that where the parties interested are
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of
the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the
others; and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a nu-
merous body of defendants, representing a common interest.84
By allowing the case to proceed with a portion of the plaintiffs rep-
resenting the others in the litigation, the Court confirmed that class
action litigation could occur. However, there was still doubt as to
whether absent class members would be bound by the judgment of a
court hearing a class action.85 When the Court adopted the Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1937, it codified class action procedure.86 Rule 23
established the requirements and procedures for federal class action
78. FED. EQUITY R. 48, 42 U.S. lvi (1842) (repealed 1912).
79. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853).
80. Id. at 298–99.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 300.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 302.
85. Spence, supra note 2. R
86. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-1\TWL101.txt unknown Seq: 11  5-NOV-19 14:13
2019] SECURITIES ACT CLASS ACTIONS 163
litigation, ushering in the era of modern class actions.87 In 1966,
amendments to Rule 23 bound absent members to class action judg-
ments.88 States also adopted rules for state class action procedures,
allowing states to have collective litigation as well.
IV. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions are often the primary mechanism for shareholders to
enforce their rights against corporate misconduct.89 Class actions are
appropriate in securities cases as they often involve a large number of
plaintiffs whose claims can be aggregated.90 Class actions also give
these plaintiffs an economically viable option to litigate cases that
would not make sense to bring individually.91 By 2006, securities liti-
gation made up 40% of all federal class action litigation.92 These cases
accounted for 76% of the ascertainable money value for settlements
of all federal class actions that year.93 Because of their broad cover-
age, traditionally most federal class action securities lawsuits arise, at
least in part, from section 10 of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.94 A
private right under Rule 10b-5 is similar to, but not identical to, a
common law deceit and misrepresentation action.95 To establish a pri-
vate Rule 10b-5 fraud action, a plaintiff must prove six elements.
These elements are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale
of securities; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.96
Securities fraud class action litigation became more frequent after
1988.97 This is primarily because of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Basic v. Levinson.98 Basic focused on the element of reliance. Basic
Inc. (“Basic”) was a manufacturing company that made refractories
for the steel industry.99 A company called Combustion Engineering,
Inc. (“Combustion”) had expressed interest in acquiring Basic.100 In
1976, Combustion’s Industrial Products Group strategic plan included
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
88. Spence, supra note 2. R
89. Stephen E. Morrissey, State Settlement Class Actions That Release Exclusive
Federal Claims: Developing a Framework for Multijurisdictional Management of
Shareholder Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (1995).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 818 (2010).
93. Id. at 825.
94. Greene et al., supra note 4, at 1–2. R
95. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
96. Id. at 341–42.
97. Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2019).
98. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
99. Id. at 226.
100. Id.
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an objective to acquire Basic for $30 million.101 In the same year, Ba-
sic and Combustion’s executives had meetings concerning the possibil-
ity of a merger.102 During 1977 and 1978, Basic made three public
statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations.103 On
December 18, 1978, Basic had the New York Stock Exchange suspend
trading of its stock and issued a statement entailing that it was ap-
proached by another company concerning a merger.104 The next day,
Basic’s board of directors announced that it supported an offer by
Combustion to purchase its stock for $46 per share.105 One day later,
Basic’s board approved of Combustion’s tender offer to buy all of Ba-
sic’s outstanding shares.106 The plaintiffs were former Basic sharehold-
ers who sold their stock after Basic first denied that they were
engaged in merger talks and before trading of its stock was suspended
in December 1978.107 They claimed that Basic’s denials of the merger
talks were misleading and therefore violated section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule 10b-5.108
Basic argued that the plaintiffs could not certify a class in the action
because each plaintiff would have had to individually rely on the state-
ments of Basic’s board.109 Prior to Basic, the reliance element of a
10b-5 claim could usually only be established if each individual plain-
tiff knew of and traded securities based on a specific falsehood.110 This
argument would make it hard for a class to be certified because indi-
vidual reliance issues were almost never the same among a class.111
Instead, the Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory, sum-
marized in Basic as:112
in an open and developed securities market, the price of a com-
pany’s stock is determined by the available material information re-
garding the company and its business . . . . Misleading statements
will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do
not directly rely on the misstatements . . . . The causal connection
between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock
in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance
on misrepresentations.113
101. Id. at 227.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 227–28.




109. Id. at 242.
110. Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions,
supra note 97, at 1069. R
111. Id.
112. Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
113. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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The Court, by adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, created a
rebuttable presumption of reliance for an entire class.114 If a security’s
price reflects all the publicly available information about the stock, an
investor then presumably relies on the price as a proxy of all informa-
tion that should be available about the security.115 Although the pre-
sumption may be rebutted, this created opportunity for investors to
more easily certify as a class when bringing 10b-5 actions.
With the Court’s adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory, Basic
provided a great benefit to securities plaintiffs.116 The number of law-
suits based on the fraud-on-the-market theory rose dramatically in re-
sponse.117 In fact, such cases tripled in the first three years after
Basic.118 After that, the number of cases continued to rise dramati-
cally for the following fifteen years.119 For example, between 2002 and
2004, over 47% of all federal lawsuits were securities actions.120 And
between 2012 and 2017, the number of securities cases filed increased
every year.121 In 2018 alone, there were 403 securities class action law-
suits filed—the second most in any year.122 In 2017 there were slightly
more, with 412.123
V. CURBING ABUSE IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Along with the increase in the number of securities class actions
came an increase in allegations that plaintiffs were abusing the pro-
cess. The Supreme Court noted Congress’s frustration over these al-
leged abuses in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit,
stating:
While acknowledging that private securities litigation was “an indis-
pensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
losses,” the House Conference Report accompanying what would
later be enacted as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 . . . identified ways in which the class-action device was being
used to injure “the entire U.S. economy.” According to the Report,
nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious dis-
covery requests, and “manipulation by class action lawyers of the
114. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, 563 U.S. 804, 810 (2011).
115. Id. at 811.
116. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009




120. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deter-
rence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV., 1534, 1539 tbl.1 (2006).
121. Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions,
supra note 97, at 1070. R
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clients whom they purportedly represent” had become rampant in
recent years . . . . Proponents of the Reform Act argued that these
abuses resulted in extortionate settlements, chilled any discussion of
issuers’ future prospects, and deterred qualified individuals from
serving on boards of directors.124
A. The PSLRA and its Unintended Consequences
To address these abuses, in 1995 Congress enacted the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).125 The PSLRA was de-
signed, at least in part, to heighten the pleading requirements for
securities fraud class actions.126 When enacting the PSLRA, Congress
focused on three major areas to reform.127 First, Congress feared that
it was too easy to bring and maintain non-meritorious securities class
actions.128 Some noted that class actions were brought so quickly after
drops in the price of securities that there could not have been time to
investigate the merits of the claim.129 Second, because of the defen-
dant’s burden in discovery, Congress had concerns that non-meritori-
ous claims settled under coercive conditions.130 It was cheaper to
settle a claim early in the process than to go through the expense of
pretrial procedures and discovery.131 Further, many class actions in-
volve very large monetary exposure, thus increasing the risk associ-
ated with a jury trial.132 Third, Congress feared that the threat of
litigation would keep companies from releasing forward-looking state-
ments that are valuable to the investing public.133 Companies would
fear that revealing more information in those statements would create
additional fodder for litigation to occur.134
To circumvent these fears, Congress made both substantive and
procedural changes to the 1933 Act in the PSLRA.135 Substantively,
the PSLRA made four major defendant-friendly changes. First, sub-
ject to limited exceptions, it allowed a plaintiff to recover damages
only by proving that “the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind.”136 To do so, the plaintiffs were required to “state with particu-
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
124. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81, (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104–369, p. 31 (1995)).
125. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
126. Perino, supra note 8, at 294. R
127. Id. at 290.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 290–91.
130. Id. at 291.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 292.
134. Id.
135. See Eugene Zelensky, New Bully on the Class Action Block: Analysis of Re-
strictions on Securities Class Actions Imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135, 1135 (1998).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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with the required state of mind” for each alleged violation of the
PSLRA.137
Even though this provision was procedural in nature, because it
changed the requirements of a complaint, it created new substantive
obligations as well.138 This heightened-pleading requirement required
that there be enough circumstantial or direct evidence to support the
allegations.139 The Court in Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights stated
that the strong inference of scienter “must be more than merely plau-
sible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”140
Another substantive change to federal securities actions in the
PSLRA was a provision that extended the safe-harbor protections for
forward-looking statements.141 There are several ways in which a safe
harbor may be claimed under the PSLRA. First, if a forward-looking
statement is identified as such and “has meaningful cautionary state-
ments identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement,” then
no action may be taken against the maker of the statement.142 Second,
the safe-harbor provision also requires that the forward-looking state-
ment be material to the action being brought.143 The third hurdle for
plaintiffs to circumvent the safe-harbor provision requires that there
be “actual knowledge by [a] person that [a] statement was false or
misleading” if the statement was made by a natural person.144 If a
business entity released the statement, the plaintiff must show that the
statement was made with approval of an executive officer of the busi-
ness and that the officer had actual knowledge that the statement was
false or misleading.145 In addition, the PSLRA limits when co-defend-
ants would have joint and several liability for securities fraud viola-
tions. The PSLRA also contains a provision limiting a plaintiff’s
recovery. The act limits damages to the difference between the plain-
tiff’s purchase price and the mean purchase price during the ninety-
day period after the last disclosure correcting a misstatement or
omission.146
There is an exception in the statute for those who repurchase secur-
ities within the ninety-day period. For securities sold and repurchased
within ninety days, the measure of damages is the difference between
the sale or purchase price and the mean trading price of the security
137. Id.
138. Zelensky, supra note 135, at 1136 n.8. R
139. Langevoort, supra note 116, at 196. R
140. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
141. Zelensky, supra note 135, at 1136. R
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
143. Id. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(ii).
144. Id. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i).
145. Id. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(ii).
146. Id. § 78u-4(e)(1).
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for a period between the corrective statement and the plaintiff’s sale
or repurchase of the security.147 The design of these damage caps is to
limit outside market conditions by allowing plaintiffs to recover only
for the damages caused by the fraud.148
Additionally, under the PSLRA, joint and several liability will be
awarded “only if the trier of fact specifically determines that such cov-
ered person knowingly committed a violation of the securities
laws.”149 Instead, the PSLRA enacted a proportionate liability
scheme, in which each defendant would only be responsible for the
percentage of damages that each defendant is determined to have
caused.150
In addition to the requirement that scienter be pled with specificity,
there are other important procedural changes. Within twenty days of
filing the complaint, there must be notice by publication in a “widely
circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service” to
inform class members of the pendency of the action and that any class
member may petition to become the lead plaintiff.151 This must be
done by the first law firm to file a complaint without any assurance
that the firm will become the lead counsel in the lawsuit.152 This, of
course, requires a financial outlay by a law firm with no guarantee of
any recovery in the case.
Prior to the PSLRA, courts would usually name the first plaintiff to
file as the lead plaintiff in the case.153 These suits often became quite
lucrative for the lead plaintiff.154 The PSLRA instead created a rebut-
table presumption that the lead plaintiff in the action should be the
person with the largest financial stake in the outcome of the case.155
To rebut this presumption, it would have to be shown that the person
with the largest stake would not fairly or adequately represent the
class or would be subject to defenses that would make them incapable
of adequately representing the class.156 Subject to the approval of the
court, the lead plaintiff selects the class counsel.157
The PSLRA also limits a person to being the lead plaintiff in only
five securities class actions within a three year period.158 This is titled
147. Id. § 78u-4(e)(2).
148. Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 30–31 (2005).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A) (2012).
150. Id. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B).
151. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A).
152. Zelensky, supra note 135, at 1137. R
153. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587,
1597–98 (2006).
154. Id. at 1598.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2012).
156. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
157. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
158. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
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as a restriction on “professional plaintiffs.”159 A professional plaintiff
is an individual who holds small interests in many companies.160 When
one of those companies is accused of misdealing, professional plain-
tiffs become a party to the case, often as the lead plaintiff.161 By own-
ing shares in the corporations, professional plaintiffs could be
exploited because they are interested parties in a class action.162 Previ-
ously, in exchange for their involvement, lead plaintiffs often received
extra payment over other class members if a case settled.163 To elimi-
nate this extra payment to professional plaintiffs, the PSLRA limits
the representative plaintiff to the same pro-rata share of the settle-
ment or judgment as other class members.164
To increase transparency, the PSLRA discourages putting settle-
ments under seal.165 A settlement may only be put under seal if it is
required to prevent direct harm to one of the parties.166 The PSLRA
also limits attorneys’ fees. The fee must be a “reasonable percentage
of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid
to the class.”167 Additionally, the terms of any settlement agreement
or proposal must be distributed to the class.168 This notice must in-
clude a statement of the potential outcome of the case, a statement of
the attorneys’ fees and costs sought in the action, identification and
contact information of counsel, and the reason for a proposed
settlement.169
All of the changes in the PSLRA added an additional layer of re-
strictions to securities actions brought in federal court.170 Only limited
procedural changes apply in state court securities class actions, al-
though it has not yet been determined which apply.171 By adding both
substantive and procedural requirements to the securities laws, Con-
gress intended to end “strike suits” against issuers of the securities.172
A “strike suit” is a case in which a person “alleg[es] violations of the
159. Id.




164. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2012).
165. Id. § 78u-4(a)(5).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 78u-4(a)(6).
168. Id. § 78u-4(a)(7).
169. Id.
170. Zelensky, supra note 135, at 1135. See also JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH R
SERV., CLARIFYING “GIBBERISH”: SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT STATE COURTS
CAN HEAR SECURITIES ACT LAWSUITS 1–2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB
10107.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XC7-77Q9].
171. Israel David & Samuel P. Groner, State Court Securities Lawsuits and the
PSLRA in a Post-‘Cyan’ Era, N.Y. L.J. (May 3, 2018), https://www.friedfrank.com/site
Files/Publications/NYLJ_Post-Cyan_David_Groner.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NKQ-
WMSQ]; see also SYKES, supra note 170, at 1–2. R
172. Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 11, at 749.
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federal securities laws in the hope that defendants will quickly settle
to avoid the expense of litigation.”173 Ending strike suits would lower
the costs associated with securities issuance “while maintaining the in-
centive for bringing meritorious actions.”174
Congress’s intent to end strike suits was not fully realized. This, in
large part, was because the PSLRA did not include a provision requir-
ing securities class actions to be litigated in federal courts.175 This led
to the unintended consequence of many plaintiffs choosing to file
their cases in state courts to avoid the heightened requirements of the
PSLRA.176 Rule 10b-5 cases were required to be filed in federal courts
because the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction under the 1934
Act.177 However, many state securities laws provide remedies similar
to those available under the 1934 Act, so plaintiffs could avoid federal
securities laws altogether.178 Additionally, the 1933 Act specifically
provides concurrent jurisdiction in actions brought under the Act.179
By not amending the 1933 Act’s concurrent jurisdiction provision, the
PSLRA did not require that 1933 Act cases be fought in federal
court.180
Congress noted that prior to passing the PSLRA, there was hardly
any significant class action litigation brought in state courts.181 After
its passage, plaintiff attorneys had the incentive to couch what could
be federal claims in terms of state claims “where essentially none of
the [PSLRA] procedural or substantive protections against abusive
suits are available.”182 Additionally, the concurrent jurisdiction of
1933 Act claims further incentivized filing these claims in state courts
to avoid the PSLRA. The PSLRA ended up having little effect on
Congress’s goal of eliminating securities class action strike suits—and
the increase in state court litigation was certainly an unintended con-
sequence. Representative Anna Eshoo, when testifying before a Sen-
ate subcommittee, noted that if Congress would have thought that
there would be a shift from federal to state court litigation, they would
have addressed it in PSLRA.183
B. The Effect of State Court Settlements on Parallel Federal Cases
Shortly after the PSLRA was enacted, the Supreme Court provided
further incentive for plaintiffs to bring securities cases in state courts.
173. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
174. Id.
175. Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 11, at 752. R
176. Id.
177. Michael A. Perino, supra note 8, at 284. R
178. O’Connor, supra note 48, at 1242. R
179. SYKES, supra note 170, at 2. R
180. Id.
181. H.R. REP. 105-640, at 10 (1998).
182. Id.
183. Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 11, at 752. R
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In 1996, the Court decided Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v.
Epstein.184 Matsushita involved a tender offer in which Matsushita
Electric Industrial Company (“Matsushita”) acquired MCA.185 Two
separate class action lawsuits were filed. One case was filed in a Dela-
ware state court claiming only that MCA violated state law by breach-
ing its fiduciary duties for not maximizing shareholder value.186
Matsushita was added to the complaint on allegations that it conspired
with MCA to violate these laws.187 The second case was filed in a Cali-
fornia federal district court, alleging that Matsushita violated the 1934
Act in its tender offer.188 The parties reached a global settlement in
the Delaware state action, releasing all claims related to the Matsu-
shita–MCA acquisition.189 At issue in the Court was Matsushita’s
claim that the Full Faith and Credit Act190 barred the federal class
from proceeding because its claims were settled as part of the Dela-
ware settlement.191 The plaintiffs in the federal class action disagreed,
noting that 1934 Act allegations were within the sole jurisdiction of
the federal courts.192 Therefore, the plaintiffs reasoned the Delaware
settlement could not be used as a vehicle to settle federal claims.193
The Court ruled that acceptance of the settlement by the Delaware
state court would have a preclusive effect on the settlement, including
the 1934 Act claims, “notwithstanding the fact that respondents could
not have pressed their [1934 Act] claims in the [Delaware state
court].”194
In addition to avoiding the heightened requirements of the PSLRA,
the holding in Matsushita provided an additional incentive to file in
state court because if an action was brought in state court, under state
court claims, the federal claims (including those under Rule 10b-5)
could be settled in the state action.195 Matsushita allowed a plaintiff to
find a plaintiff-friendly state court in which the class could receive a
global settlement of both the federal and state claims.196 These settle-
ments are often “sweetheart deals” where counsel receive sizable at-
torneys’ fees while leaving the class plaintiffs less than what they
expected to receive in a separate court action.197 The combination of
184. Matsushita v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
185. Id. at 369–70.
186. Id. at 370.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 371.
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
191. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 372.
192. Id. at 380.
193. Id. at 372.
194. Id. at 378.
195. Perino, supra note 8, at 310–11. R
196. Id. at 311.
197. Edward F. Sherman, Class Action Fairness Act and the Federalization of Class
Actions, 238 F.R.D. 321, 344 n.138 (2007).
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the PSLRA and Matsushita led to a dramatic rise in the number of
cases brought in state courts.198
C. The SLUSA Loopholes
Congress, soon after realizing that the PSLRA caused a spike in
state securities class action litigation, took action by enacting the Se-
curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).199
Congress decided that the provisions in the 1933 Act that allowed for
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, coupled with its anti-removal
provisions, prevented the PSLRA from accomplishing its goals.200 In
the introduction to SLUSA, Congress specifically found:
[I]n order to prevent certain State private securities class action law-
suits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the
[PSLRA], it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while
preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities
regulators and not changing the current treatment of individual
lawsuits.201
SLUSA was designed to create a balance between state and federal
class actions. Claims that only impacted one state were to be left to
that state’s courts. Claims of national importance would no longer cir-
cumvent the heightened requirements of the PSLRA; SLUSA elimi-
nated state court jurisdiction over these class actions.202 They did so
primarily in section 16(b) of the Act, which states in relevant part:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging—
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.203
SLUSA broadly defined the terms “covered class action” and “cov-
ered security.” A “covered class action” is one in which damages are
sought for fifty or more people or prospective class members.204 A
“covered security” is one that is traded on a national exchange.205
SLUSA also amended the anti-removal provision of the 1933 Act. It
198. Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 11, at 752. R
199. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
200. O’Connor, supra note 48, at 1243. R
201. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act § 2(5).
202. Greene et al., supra note 4, at 2. R
203. This section was later codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B) (2011).
205. Id. § 77r(b) (2015).
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stated that any “covered class action brought in any state court involv-
ing a covered security . . . shall be removable to the Federal district
court in which the action is pending.”206 Additionally, it limited the
concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts provided in the 1933
Act. SLUSA allows for concurrent jurisdiction “except . . . with re-
spect to covered class actions.”207
Eliminating the anti-removal provisions and concurrent jurisdiction
had the effect of preempting class action litigation of covered securi-
ties that are based on state law.208 This preemption led to covered
class actions being primarily litigated on claims under federal legisla-
tion (the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act).209 Therefore, removing a class
action brought under state law involving a covered security to federal
court effectively dismissed the state law claims.210 Congress enacted
SLUSA in part because national securities issuers were potentially
subject to a patchwork of the legislative will of each of the states.211
The dismissal of state court actions, upon removal, prevents state
courts from deciding not to enforce the removal provisions of
SLUSA.212 Thus, SLUSA ended much of the forum shopping that led
cases to be filed in states that were seen as plaintiff-friendly.213
However, like the PSLRA, SLUSA had unintended consequences
after its enactment. In its attempt to balance the state and federal ac-
tions, Congress left many avenues open for a state court to hear secur-
ities cases. For example, SLUSA specifically excluded actions that
were brought against state and local pension funds.214 It was also theo-
rized that because SLUSA only pertained to covered securities, ac-
tions brought concerning securities not traded on a national exchange
could still be litigated under state laws.215 Congress likely intended
these provisions to allow for these types of cases to still be brought in
state courts. What Congress did not address became more impor-
tant—and led to SLUSA’s own unintended consequences. SLUSA
left what has been described as a loophole, which allowed some plain-
tiffs to still litigate securities class actions in state courts.216
206. Id. § 77p(c) (2018).
207. Id. § 77v(a) (2018).
208. O’Brien, supra note 13, at 861–62. R
209. Id. at 862.
210. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 644 (2006).
211. Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 11, at 757. R
212. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (2018).
213. See id.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(2)(A) (2018).
215. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 636 n.1.
216. See, e.g., J. Tyler Butts, Removal of Covered Class Actions Under SLUSA: The
Failure of Plain Meaning and Legislative Intent as Interpretive Devices, and the Su-
preme Court’s Decisive Solution, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 169, 187 (2010); Cook
supra note 17, at 168. R
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SLUSA did not in itself displace state law with federal law.217 This
led to questions of how the removal provision should be applied.
SLUSA’s removal provision, described in section 16(c) of the act,218
reads:
Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a cov-
ered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be removable to
the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pend-
ing, and shall be subject to subsection (b).219
By referring to section 16(b) of SLUSA, the removal provision in
section 16(c) facially only applies to actions “based upon the statutory
or common law of any State.”220 By its terms, therefore, SLUSA does
not impact claims based upon federal law. The 1934 Act, however,
does require that cases brought under it be filed in federal court.221
However, SLUSA does not address the concurrent jurisdiction and
anti-removal provisions in section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.222 The loop-
hole in SLUSA’s jurisdictional provisions led to the controversial re-
sult that claims based on state laws that allege misrepresentation or
omission of material fact may be litigated only in federal court; how-
ever, federal claims under the 1933 Act may be litigated in state courts
in some jurisdictions.223
By not addressing the anti-removal and concurrent jurisdiction
clauses of the 1933 Act, SLUSA led to a split in interpretation by
federal district courts. In a rare occurrence, this split in district courts
did not have any appellate circuit court opinions to interpret them.224
These district court cases typically involved a question of remand
when a case had been removed to federal court.225 Because remand
orders cannot be appealed,226 there “likely never will be” any circuit
court decisions.227 District courts in the First and Seventh Circuits
generally supported a narrow interpretation of SLUSA’s anti-removal
provision.228 These courts interpreted the language in section 16(b) of
217. Id.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2018).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 77p(b).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2018).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2018).
223. O’Brien, supra note 13, at 863. R
224. Jennifer Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
349, 360 (2012).
225. See id.
226. 28 U.S.C § 1447(d) (2018).
227. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 3, Cyan, Inc.
v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (No. 15-1439) [hereinafter
Brief of Law Professors].
228. Butts, supra note 216, at 175–76. R
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SLUSA to be specific as to where removal was allowed.229 This more
narrow interpretation allowed for 1933 Act fraud claims to be litigated
in state courts without the ability to be removed.
District courts in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits approached
SLUSA’s anti-removal provision differently. They applied a broad in-
terpretation based on congressional intent.230 These courts reasoned
that it was Congress’s intent under SLUSA to have all covered securi-
ties class action cases litigated in the federal courts.231
The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits’ district courts were inconsis-
tent in how they interpreted SLUSA’s removal provision. Sometimes
they would interpret the statute broadly, and sometimes narrowly.232
There were times within months where the same district would inter-
pret the statute in opposite ways.233
The Supreme Court, in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust touched on
the removal issue.234 Kircher, however, focused on whether an order
remanding a case removed under SLUSA was appealable.235 The
Court held that those remands were not.236 In its discussion, the Court
noted that there was “no reason to reject the straightforward reading:
removal and jurisdiction to deal with removed cases is limited to those
precluded by the terms of subsection (b).”237 Under this interpreta-
tion, removal to federal court would be unavailable only for state law
claims in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.238 The
Court further stated “[i]f the action is not precluded [under subsection
(b)], the federal court likewise has no jurisdiction to touch the case on
the merits, and the proper course is to remand to the state court
. . . .”239 Kircher did not involve any alleged violations of the 1933
Act.240 Instead, it involved claims only under state law.241 As such,
this part of Kircher is often deemed to be dicta, and is not considered
mandatory authority in many subsequent cases examining the remov-
229. Id. See also Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL
1888843 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003); In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H.
2004).
230. Butts, supra note 216, at 176. See also Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 05-316-H, R
2005 WL 2592229 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005); In re King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 230
F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 2004); Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062, 2007
WL 1381746 (D.N.J. May 7, 2007).
231. Butts, supra note 216, at 176–78. R
232. Id. at 178.
233. Johnson, supra note 224, at 360. R
234. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
235. Id. at 635–36.
236. Id. at 636.
237. Id. at 643.
238. Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 11, at 774. R
239. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 644.
240. O’Connor, supra note 48, at 1247–48.
241. Id.
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ability of 1933 Act claims.242 Therefore, Kircher did little to close the
split in the courts regarding SLUSA’s removal provision.
D. CAFA Exclusions
In 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(“CAFA”).243 CAFA was directed at perceived abuses in class actions
in general.244 Congress noted that there had been a “flood” of state
court class actions in “improbable locations.”245 Further, Congress
noted that in the decade prior to CAFA’s adoption, there had been
many abuses in class actions that harmed both legitimate class action
claims and interstate commerce.246 For example, Congress recognized
that class members often received little or no benefit while their coun-
sel were awarded large fees.247 Congress intended to expand federal
jurisdiction over class action lawsuits to remedy these abuses,248 serv-
ing Congress’s purpose of addressing class action cases of national im-
portance in federal courts.249 CAFA accomplished this by giving
federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions where the
amount in controversy is over $5 million, there are more than 100
plaintiffs, and there is minimal diversity of the parties.250
While addressing class action lawsuits generally, Congress specifi-
cally excluded securities class actions from CAFA’s provisions. CAFA
states that its provision giving original jurisdiction in federal courts:
shall not apply to any class action that solely involves a claim—
(A) concerning a covered security as defined under . . . the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 . . . and . . . of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
. . . ;
(B) that relates to the internal affairs or governance of a corpora-
tion or other form of business enterprise and that arises under or by
virtue of the laws of the State in which such corporation or business
enterprise is incorporated or organized; or
(C) that relates to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and
obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any security (as
242. Butts, supra note 216, at 194.
243. Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
244. Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action
Abuses” Through an Understanding of Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82
UMKC L. REV. 133, 134 (2013).
245. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13–14. It should be noted that there is a question as to
whether there was adequate information to make those determinations, and therefore
the assertion of a flood of state class actions made be exaggerated. See, e.g., Moore,
supra note 244. R
246. CAFA § 2(a)(2).
247. Id. § 2(a)(3).
248. Cook, supra note 17, at 622. R
249. CAFA § 2(b)(2).
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5) (2012). Minimal diversity only requires that any
plaintiff who is a class member must be from a jurisdiction other than any defendant.
Id.
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defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and
the regulations issued thereunder).251
Congress reasoned that the securities exemptions were included in
CAFA “to avoid disturbing in any way the federal vs. state court juris-
dictional lines already drawn in the securities litigation class action
context by the enactment of [SLUSA].”252
E. 1933 Act Claims in State Court After CAFA
Because CAFA did not seek “to disturb the carefully crafted frame-
work” of jurisdiction over securities claims established in SLUSA, the
issues left unaddressed in SLUSA had a distinct impact on the litiga-
tion landscape.253 In the decades since SLUSA’s enactment, there
have been dozens of state court class actions litigated under 1933 Act
claims.254 The number of class action cases filed in state courts under
the 1933 Act indicated that forum shopping was a viable option.255
Because CAFA reduced the ability to forum shop in class actions, it
seemed curious to some that securities cases were specifically ex-
cluded.256 The split involved some district courts finding that SLUSA
granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over covered class actions that
allege only claims under the 1933 Act.257 Others held the plain lan-
guage of the 1933 Act would not allow for removal of claims that were
brought in state courts.258
Forum shopping led to plaintiffs filing 1933 Act cases in courts
where they were not likely to be removed. California, particularly in
the Northern District, and New York, particularly in the Southern
District, handle most of the securities cases in the United States.259
Between 2011 and 2015, federal district courts dismissed 29% of cases
that were filed with only 1933 Act claims.260 In contrast, during this
same period, California state courts only dismissed 8% of these cases
without leave to amend.261 Since California federal district courts gen-
erally allowed 1933 Act class actions to proceed in state court, Califor-
nia state courts saw a great increase in the amount of cases brought
there. In 2010, California state courts only had one new 1933 Act class
action filed.262 These numbers increased dramatically in subsequent
years: 2015 saw fifteen cases, 2016 saw nineteen, 2017 saw seven, and
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) (2012).
252. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 45 (2005).
253. Id. at 50.
254. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 227, at 3. R
255. Cook, supra note 17, at 622. R
256. Id.
257. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 227, at 1. R
258. Id. at 6 n.10, 7.
259. Id. at 8.
260. Id. at 3.
261. Id.
262. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 122, at 19. R
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2018 saw sixteen.263 Thus, CAFA did little to quell securities class ac-
tions being brought in state courts.
VI. CYAN CONFIRMS THAT 1933 ACT CLAIMS MAY BE BROUGHT
IN STATE COURTS
In 2018, the Supreme Court’s Cyan decision resolved part of the
competing opinions of the federal district courts regarding jurisdiction
of class actions brought under the 1933 Act.264 The petitioners in Cyan
were the officers and directors of Cyan, Inc. (“Cyan”), a telecommuni-
cations company.265 The respondents were a group consisting of one
individual investor and three pension funds (“Investors”).266 The In-
vestors had purchased Cyan stock during an initial public offering.267
After the stock declined in value, the investors initiated a class action
against Cyan in California Superior Court.268 The complaint alleged
that Cyan’s offering documents contained material misstatements.269
These claims were made solely as violations of the 1933 Act and did
not contain any alleged violations of state law.270 Cyan moved to dis-
miss the lawsuit alleging that state courts lacked subject matter juris-
diction to hear 1933 Act claims.271 The California Superior Court
denied the motion to dismiss, and the California appellate courts de-
clined to review the ruling.272
Cyan based its dismissal motion on an interpretation of SLUSA
amendments to the concurrent jurisdiction section of the 1933 Act
that is now codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).273 Essentially, Cyan claimed
that this statute, as amended, stripped state courts of the power to
adjudicate state law claims that involved covered class actions under
the SLUSA definition.274 To resolve a split among the federal and
state courts regarding state court jurisdiction of 1933 Act class actions,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.275
Cyan claimed that state courts lacked jurisdiction, arguing that the
legislative history and purpose behind SLUSA’s enactment prohibited
it.276 Cyan argued that SLUSA was put in place to make good on the
promise of the PSLRA heightened pleading requirements by requir-
263. Id.
264. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).










275. Id. at 1068–69.
276. Id. at 1072.
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ing that 1933 Act class actions be brought solely in federal courts.277
Cyan cited a legislative report that indicated that SLUSA was con-
ceived “to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections
[the PSLRA] provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State,
rather than in Federal, court.”278
The Court instead focused on the interpretation of the statute itself.
The Court’s primary focus was on a clause in section 77v(a) that reads:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction[,]
concurrent with State and Territorial courts, except as provided in
section 77p of this title with respect to covered class actions, of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this subchapter.279
The italicized part of the statute was referred to by the Court as
section 77v(a)’s “except clause.”280 Cyan debated over how to recon-
cile the except clause with section 77(p), the statute referred to in the
clause. Cyan argued that the clause only referred to the covered class
actions that are defined in section 77p(f)(2).281 Cyan maintained that
there were “two halves” to the except clause, the first was to point the
reader in the direction of where to look (section 77p).282 The except
clause’s second part then gave effect to the words “covered class ac-
tion.”283 If the section referred to covered class actions, then the ex-
cept clause would remove concurrent jurisdiction to all claims,
whether based on federal or state law.
The Investors argued that the except clause was only a conforming
amendment.284 It therefore should be read as aligning the jurisdic-
tional provisions of section 77v(a) with the provisions of section 77p
that preclude state law claims from being litigated in state courts.285
This would leave other cases, such as those filed with only 1933 Act
claims, unaffected.286 Cyan responded that if this were the interpreta-
tion, then the except clause would “serve no purpose at all.”287
The Court, when examining the except clause, experienced diffi-
culty interpreting the interplay between sections 77v(a) and 77p. Dur-
ing oral argument Justice Alito noted:
Our late colleague [Justice Scalia] wrote a book called Reading
Law, which provides guidance about how you read statutes. And I
277. Id.
278. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105–803, at 13 (1998)). Cyan also referred
to other legislative reports with similar language. Id. at 1072.
279. Id. at 1068 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)) (emphasis added).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1070.
282. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 10. R
283. Id.
284. Id. at 51.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1073 (2018).
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looked through that to see what we are supposed to do when Con-
gress writes gibberish. And that’s what we have here. You said it’s
obtuse. That’s flattering. And we have very smart lawyers here who
have come up with creative interpretations, but this is gibberish. It’s
. . . just gibberish.288
When the Investors’ attorney tried to clarify their interpretation of
the except clause, Justice Gorsuch responded with: “[A]ren’t we stuck
with gibberish your way too? I mean, it seems like it’s gibberish all the
way down here . . . .”289 After much frustration, Justice Gorsuch later
stated that the Court had to try to give effect to Congress’s language,
opining that “respect for the legislative process dictates that we afford
some meaning to these words.”290
When giving meaning to the words of section 77v(a), the unanimous
Court ruled that the except clause modified all of section 77p.291 In
addressing Cyan’s argument that it only modified covered class ac-
tions, the Court stated that it would be “cherry pick[ing] from the ma-
terial covered by the statutory cross-reference.”292 If Congress wanted
the except clause to refer only to section 77p(f)(2), it presumably
would have done so by adding that subsection into the statute when it
was created.293 By its interpretation of the except clause, the Court
ruled that under SLUSA “state court jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims
. . . continues undisturbed.”294
A. The Impact of Cyan
Cyan had an immediate impact on the filing of new 1933 Act class
action claims in state courts. Prior to SLUSA, judges in the Southern
District of New York generally ruled that federal courts had exclusive
jurisdiction over 1933 Act class actions.295 Accordingly, New York saw
a dearth of 1933 Act cases filed in state courts in the eight years prior
to Cyan’s ruling in 2018.296 After Cyan clarified that there was concur-
rent jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims, the number of 1933 Act class
actions increased significantly.297 New York state courts saw thirteen
new 1933 Act cases filed, where it had none the year before.298 All
thirteen were filed after the Cyan decision.299 This flurry of new cases
suggests that forum shopping 1933 Act cases in state courts is alive
288. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 11. R
289. Id. at 47.
290. Id. at 48.
291. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1063–64.
292. Id. at 1070.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1069.
295. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 227, at 8. R
296. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 122, at 19. R
297. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1063.
298. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 122, at 19. R
299. Id.
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and well. This trend is likely to continue, with the probable result that
some states will emerge as plaintiff-friendly. These states will then
start receiving a greater portion of the new claims.
B. Does Cyan Leave a Loophole for Non-Covered Securities?
Another loophole not addressed in Cyan was the impact of CAFA
on 1933 Act claims. Because the securities in question in Cyan were
covered securities, they met CAFA’s securities exemption, so Cyan
did not discuss CAFA.300 Currently there is a split in the federal cir-
cuit courts about how to interpret the CAFA removal provision’s im-
pact on non-covered securities.301 These securities do not meet any of
the three exemptions articulated in CAFA.302 Rather, these cases ad-
dress two apparently competing statutes. Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act
generally forbids removal of covered securities cases to federal
court.303 CAFA, on the other hand, requires removal of most class
actions within its coverage to federal court.
There are some types of class actions in which CAFA forbids re-
moval. The first is the “local controversy exemption.”304 Under this
exception, removal must be declined over a class action where two-
thirds of the plaintiffs and at least one of the defendants are from the
same state and that state is where the principal injuries occurred.305
Significant relief must be sought from that defendant because of his or
her conduct, so long as no similar class action was filed against any of
the same defendants within the past three years.306 There is also a
“home state controversy exemption.”307 This precludes removal when
“two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in
the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed.”308 Additionally, federal courts
have discretion to decline jurisdiction over cases in which between
one-third and two-thirds of the plaintiffs and the defendants are citi-
300. Philip C. Babler, SCOTUS Keeps Door Open for Federal-Law, State-Court Se-






301. Johnson, supra note 224, at 359–60. R
302. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) (2012).
303. 15 U.S.C § 77v(a) (2012).
304. Johnson, supra note 224, at 357. R
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (2012).
306. Id.
307. Johnson, supra note 224, at 357. R
308. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2012).
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zens of the same state.309 If a security does not meet one of the ex-
emptions under CAFA, it is removable to federal court.310
The conflict over whether CAFA removal would trump the non-
removal provision of SLUSA was realized in the Ninth Circuit in Lu-
ther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing.311 In Luther, the plaintiffs
initiated a class action alleging only violations of the 1933 Act.312 They
alleged that the defendants violated sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of
the 1933 Act by issuing false and misleading registration statements
and prospectus documents for some mortgage pass-through certifi-
cates. The parties agreed that the pass-through certificates were not
covered securities as defined by SLUSA.313 The defendants removed
the case to federal court using CAFA.314 Once in federal court, the
plaintiffs then tried to remand the case back to state court stating that
section 22(a) of the 1933 Act prohibited removal.315 In deciding the
case, the Ninth Circuit stated “[i]t is a basic principle of statutory con-
struction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific
subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum.”316 Using this maxim of statutory construction,
the court noted that section 22(a) of the 1933 Act was the more spe-
cific statute, arising only for securities claims.317 CAFA applied to
class actions in general.318 As such, the Ninth Circuit applied section
22(a) and not CAFA, and therefore remanded the case back to state
court.319 After Luther, almost all California federal courts have re-
manded 1933 Act cases to state court.320 This appears to have led, at
least in part, to the increase of 1933 Act claim California class actions
because the increase happened soon after Luther.321
The Seventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Katz v. Ger-
ardi.322 At issue in Katz were securities of a real investment trust that
309. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
310. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(A). There are other limited exemptions, but they would
likely not affect private securities litigation. See Johnson, supra note 224, at 360. R
311. Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir.
2008).
312. Id. at 1032–33.
313. Id. at 1033 n.1.
314. Id. at 1033.
315. Id.





320. Michael W. Stocker & Francis P. McConville, Securities Act Cases Are Surg-
ing. . .in State Courts?, L.A. DAILY J. (July 28, 2015), https://info.labaton.com/hubfs/
Daily-Journal-Stocker-McConville.pdf?t=1542747634819 [https://perma.cc/VY9P-
TK3Q].
321. See supra text accompanying notes 259–63.
322. Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
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were exchanged for some real property.323 After a merger, holdings in
those securities were transferred to a different security with allegedly
less tax benefits.324 The plaintiffs alleged that this transfer violated the
terms of the original security.325 As in Luther, these securities were
not covered securities as defined in SLUSA.326 The plaintiffs filed a
state law class action in Illinois.327 The defendants then used CAFA to
remove the case to federal court.328 The Northern District of Illinois,
citing Luther, remanded the case back to state court stating that sec-
tion 22(a) prohibited the removal because it was more specific than
CAFA.329 The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing the remand decision, spe-
cifically disagreed with the holding in Luther.330 The court opined that
the statutory maxim used to decide Luther did not apply. It reasoned
that a specific statute impacted by a newer but more general one only
controls the newer one when one of the statutes is a subset of the
other.331 The Seventh Circuit held that section 22(a) is not a subset of
CAFA, noting:
Is the 1933 Act more specific because it deals only with securities
law, or is [CAFA] more specific because it deals only with nation-
wide class actions? There is no answer to such a question, which
means that the canon favoring the specific law over the general one
won’t solve our problem.332
The court, by opining that the maxim did not apply, ruled that the
case was removable under CAFA.333 Opposite to the Ninth Circuit in
Luther, the Seventh Circuit allowed CAFA to trump section 22(a).
The Seventh Circuit again allowed for removal of claims for non-
covered securities in Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc.334
Appert involved a fee dispute on the purchase of some securities.335 In
dispute over a misrepresentation, the Northern District of Illinois
found that the misrepresentation was not material, and dismissed the
case.336 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant had
met its jurisdictional burden to bring the case under CAFA.337 It was
incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the securities would be ex-
323. Id. at 559.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 562–63.
327. See id. at 559.
328. Id.
329. Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08 cv 04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23,
2008).
330. Katz, 552 F.3d at 562.
331. Id. at 561.
332. Id. at 561–62.
333. Id. at 562.
334. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d. 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2012).
335. Id. at 613.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 617.
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empted because of CAFA’s securities exemptions.338 The plaintiff
could not, and as such, the court ruled that CAFA required removal to
federal court.339
A New York federal district court also disagreed with the rationale
espoused by the Ninth Circuit. In New Jersey Carpenters Vacation
Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust, a class action over the pro-
spectus for the issuance of bonds also raised the question of re-
moval.340 The plaintiffs brought claims under the 1933 Act and the
defendant removed the case to federal court based on CAFA. The
plaintiffs then tried to remand the case back to state court.341 The
court found that the bonds did not meet any exceptions laid out in
CAFA. The court ruled against the remand stating that CAFA “cre-
ates original jurisdiction for and removability of all class actions that
meet the minimal requirements and do not fall under one of the lim-
ited exceptions.”342 The court, in its denial of the motion, noted that
there was a split in the circuits and that CAFA should overrule section
22(a) because this interpretation “comports more closely with the de-
cisions in this [the Second] Circuit.”343
The split in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits as to whether CAFA
trumps section 22(a) provides yet another avenue for forum shopping.
It further appears that in New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund, courts
in the Second Circuit also disagree with the Ninth Circuit approach,
adopting that of the Seventh Circuit. This creates another split be-
tween the two jurisdictions with the most securities cases, California
and New York. If a plaintiff initiates a class action, he or she may
prefer to bring it in a state that appears to oppose removal so the case
will remain in state court. If neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
address the issue, other circuits may also opine on the issue, broaden-
ing the options for plaintiff forum shopping. Other legal scholars note
this irony, stating that “plaintiffs will use forum-shopping to avoid a
statute [CAFA] whose very purpose was to prevent plaintiffs from fo-
rum-shopping.”344
VII. CONCLUSION
There has been a long history of plaintiffs attempting to bring secur-
ities class actions in state courts, especially those seen as plaintiff-
338. Id. at 619.
339. See id. at 621–22.
340. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-4, 581 F.
Supp. 2d 581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 584 (emphasis supplied).
343. Id. at 582.
344. James E. Brandt & Eric S. Olney, Removal of Class Action Securities Cases in
the Age of CAFA, BLOOMBERG L. REPORTS (2009), https://www.lw.com/thought
Leadership/removal-class-action-securities-cases-in-age-of-cafa [https://perma.cc/
9UCT-UUQ3].
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friendly. Cyan has affirmed that this type of forum shopping is still
available in 1933 Act cases involving covered securities. This option
exists even after Congress enacted the PSLRA and SLUSA to address
securities class actions specifically. The PSLRA was ineffective be-
cause it had the unintended consequence of pushing cases to state
courts. SLUSA, which was designed to force securities class action liti-
gation to take place in federal court, left a loophole for 1933 Act
claims. This is because Congress, when drafting SLUSA, was unclear
enough that Justice Alito called its removal provision gibberish. In ad-
dition to the PSLRA and SLUSA, which only affected securities class
actions, Congress also created CAFA. CAFA was enacted to require
the litigation of all class actions of national importance in federal
courts. However, the securities exemptions in CAFA allowed for an-
other loophole. It caused a split in the circuits as to whether 1933 Act
class action claims over non-covered securities are exempted from
CAFA. This now allows another avenue for forum shopping.
In Cyan, the Court showed its reluctance to use legislative history
and intent to determine jurisdictional requirements under SLUSA.
The Court resolved Cyan primarily using statutory interpretation,
even though the statute was unclearly written. This indicates that the
Court believes that any attempts at clarifying are purely in the pur-
view of Congress.
It is unclear how courts will interpret CAFA’s impact on the 1933
Act’s concurrent jurisdiction and anti-removal provisions in class ac-
tions involving non-covered securities. Certainly, the Supreme Court
could close the split in the circuits. If it were to adopt the Ninth Cir-
cuit interpretation, then class actions over covered and non-covered
securities could both take place in state courts. If it adopted the Sev-
enth Circuit interpretation, then class actions involving covered secur-
ities could take place in state courts, but those involving non-covered
securities would have to be brought in federal courts. Either way,
Cyan would still allow some avenues for forum shopping.
Congress could easily remedy these loopholes by creating clear stat-
utes that would put all securities class actions of national importance
in federal court. This would meet the stated goals of the PSLRA,
SLUSA, and CAFA. It could close the loophole that SLUSA created
allowing 1933 Act claims to be litigated in state courts by following
the Court’s recommendation in Cyan. Congress could add an amend-
ment to SLUSA specifying that the exemptions referred to in section
77v apply to section 77p(f)(2) instead of section 77p in its entirety.
Alternatively, CAFA could be amended to clarify that it does require
removal of cases over non-covered securities to federal court. If Con-
gress chooses either option, then 1933 Act cases of national impor-
tance would have to be litigated in federal court. This would meet the
stated goals of the PSLRA, SLUSA, and CAFA.
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